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In The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (2015), Bruce Waller sets out to explain why the 
belief in individual moral responsibility is so strong. He begins by pointing out that there is a 
strange disconnect between the strength of philosophical arguments in support of moral 
responsibility and the strength of philosophical belief in moral responsibility. While the many 
arguments in favor of moral responsibility are inventive, subtle, and fascinating, Waller points 
out that even the most ardent supporters of moral responsibility acknowledge that the arguments 
in its favor are far from conclusive; and some of the least confident concerning the arguments for 
moral responsibility—such as Van Inwagen—are most confident of the truth of moral 
responsibility. Thus, argues Waller, whatever the verdict on the strength of philosophical 
arguments for moral responsibility, it is clear that belief in moral responsibility—whether among 
philosophers or the folk—is based on something other than philosophical reasons.  
 
He goes on to argue that there are several sources for the strong belief in moral responsibility, 
but the following four are particularly influential: First, moral responsibility is based in a 
powerful “strike back” emotion that we share with other animals. Second, there is a deep-rooted 
“belief in a just world”—a belief that, according to Waller, most philosophers reject when they 
consciously consider it, but which has a deep nonconscious influence on what we regard as just 
treatment and which provides subtle (but mistaken) support for belief in moral responsibility. 
Third, there is a pervasive moral responsibility system—extending over criminal justice as well 
as “common sense”—that makes the truth of moral responsibility seem obvious, and makes 
challenges to moral responsibility seem incoherent. Finally, there is the enormous confidence we 
have in the power of reason, which mistakenly leads us to believe that our conscious, rational, 
and critically reflective selves are constantly guiding our behavior in accordance with our deep 
values.     
 
In these comments, I would like to discuss the many points of agreement I have with Waller, 
providing along the way additional fuel for his skeptical fire (i.e., his moral responsibility 
skepticism and his skeptical analysis of the source of our strong belief in moral responsibility). I 
will also discuss, however, my one main point of disagreement—i.e., his desire to preserve the 
conception of free will. Waller believes free will can “flourish” in the absence of moral 
responsibility (see Ch.8), while I maintain they that the variety of free will that is of central 
philosophical and practical importance is the sort required for moral responsibility in a particular 
but pervasive sense. This sense of moral responsibility is set apart by the notion of basic desert 
and is purely backward-looking and non-consequentialist (see Pereboom 2001, 2014; Caruso and 
Morris, forthcoming). Understood this way, the sort of free will at issue in the historical debate is 
a kind of power or ability an agent must possess in order to justify certain kinds of desert-based 
judgments, attitudes, or treatments in response to decisions or actions that the agent performed or 
failed to perform. 
 
To begin, let me first acknowledge my agreement with Waller concerning the philosophical 
arguments for moral responsibility, which tend to be weaker than the corresponding belief 
philosophers have in moral responsibility. Consider, for example, Peter van Inwagen’s dogged, 
resolute, and (one may say) stubborn belief in moral responsibility. After championed the 
consequence argument in favor of incompatibilism, van Inwagen proceeds to argue that we must 
reject determinism even though it means free will “remains a mystery” (1983, 2000), since to 
“deny the free-will thesis is to deny the existence of moral responsibility, which would be 
absurd” (1983: 223). He then proceeds to argue that, if science were one day able to present us 
with compelling reasons for believing in determinism, “[t]hen, and only then, I think, should we 
become compatibilists” (1983: 223)—despite, of course, all his efforts defending the 
consequence argument.  
 
Additional evidence of the kind of stubbornness Waller has in mind can be found among agent-
causal libertarians—such as C. A. Campbell (1957), Richard Taylor (1963), and Roderick 
Chisholm (1982)—who are willing to embrace mysterious and “god-like” powers and abilities to 
preserve moral responsibility. Chisholm, for example, famously argued: “If we are responsible, 
and if what I have been trying to say is true, then we have a prerogative which some would 
attribute only to God: each of us, when we really act, is a prime mover unmoved” (1982: 32). As 
Waller so eloquently and correctly points out: “When contemporary philosophers are willing to 
posit miracles in order to save moral responsibility, the philosophical belief in moral 
responsibility obviously runs deep and strong” (2015: 3).  
 
Compatibilists, of course, reject miracles and propose accounts of moral responsibility consistent 
with our naturalistic (and even deterministic) worldview, yet they seldom provide justification 
for the moral responsibility system itself. In lieu of justifying the moral responsibility system, 
compatibilists typically take the system as given and instead focus on what attitudes, judgments, 
and treatments are justified from within the system. P. F. Strawson (1962) is a good example of 
this. His defense of the reactive attitudes takes our normal moral responsibility practices as given 
and proceeds from there to articulate special circumstances when it is acceptable not to hold 
someone morally responsible or to excuse them—e.g., when they are profoundly impaired by 
delusion or lack any moral capacity, either temporarily or permanently. In such circumstances, 
we adopt what Strawson calls the objective attitude. But according to Strawson and his 
followers, the denial of all moral responsibility is unacceptable, self-defeating, and/or 
impossible, since to permanently excuse everyone would entail that “nobody knows what he’s 
doing or that everybody’s behavior is unintelligible in terms of conscious purposes or that 
everybody lives in a world of delusion or that nobody has a moral sense…” (Strawson 1982: 74). 
The problem with this defense of moral responsibility, however, is that it takes for granted the 
very thing in need of justification. As Waller so eloquently explains:   
  
[I]f we start from the assumption of the moral responsibility system (assumptions that are 
so common and deep that they are difficult to escape), then the denial of moral 
responsibility is absurd and self-defeating. But the universal denial of moral 
responsibility does not start from the assumption that under normal circumstances we are 
morally responsible, and it does not proceed from that starting point to enlarge and 
extend the range of excuses to cover everyone (so that everyone is profoundly flawed). 
That is indeed a path to absurdity. Rather, those who reject moral responsibility reject the 
basic system which starts from the assumption that all minimally competent persons (all 
who reach the plateau level) are morally responsible. For those who deny moral 
responsibility, it is never fair to treat anyone as morally responsible, no matter how 
reasonable, competent, self-efficacious, strong-willed, and clear-sighted that person may 
be. (2015: 103) 
 
This, of course, is because the basic challenge to the moral responsibility system presented by 
skeptics—e.g., Waller (2011, 2015), Pereboom (2001, 2014), Levy (2011), G. Strawson (1986), 
and myself (Caruso 2012)—does not accept the rules of that system.  
 
Since I agree with Waller that belief in moral responsibility is stronger than the philosophical 
arguments presented in their favor—either because those arguments are scientifically implausible 
(as in the case of agent causation), or they beg the question (as in the case of Strawson and his 
followers), or they end up “changing the subjection” (see Waller’s discussion in Ch.2)—in 
searching for the roots of the belief in moral responsibility, we must dig deeper than 
philosophical arguments. I also agree with Waller that the source of the strong belief in moral 
responsibility stems in large part from (a) our “strike-back” emotion, (b) the deep rooted belief in 
a just world, (c) the pervasiveness of the moral responsibility system that makes the truth of 
moral responsibility seem obvious, and (d) our overconfidence in the powers of reason.  
 
Since I have already discussed the connection between just world belief and beliefs about free 
will, moral responsibility, and just deserts at great length elsewhere (Caruso 2014a, 2014b, 
2016a; see also Carey and Paulhus 2013; Nadelhoffer and Tocchetto 2013), and since my (brief) 
comments on Strawson above have already highlighted the power of the moral responsibility 
system to obfuscate the fundamental question regarding the justification of the system itself, I 
will limit my focus here to Waller’s discussion of the “strike back” emotion.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that human beings share a powerful strike back emotion with 
other animals. When we are wronged, and when we observe another being wronged, we feel a 
strong and immediate urge to strike back. According to Waller, this strike back emotion is one of 
the main sources of our strong belief in moral responsibility: 
 
The deepest roots of our commitment to moral responsibility are in powerful emotions, 
rather than reason. There are many sources for the stubborn belief in moral responsibility, 
and some are quite subtle. But the most basic source has the subtlety of a barroom brawl, 
a back-country feud, or rats locked in a frenzied death struggle: the strike-back desire 
when we are harmed. (2015: 39) 
 
He goes on to add: 
 
The vengeance motive is powerful, revenge is sweet, and retribution feels righteous. The 
desire to strike back, to take arms against a sea of troubles, to take revenge: this is not 
only a powerful desire, but one that feels morally justified. We like to punish, and we are 
willing to sacrifice in order to do so (Fehr and Gachter 2002; Haidt 2012, 178-179). 
(2015: 39) 
 
This emotional source of our belief in moral responsibility is strong, pervasive, and (I would 
argue) often counterproductive with regard to achieving certain desired ends such as future 
safety, reconciliation, and moral formation (see Pereboom 2014).  
 
Neil Levy, for example, does an excellent job articulating how our moral emotions tend to fuel 
retributive impulses, which in turn often leads to excessively punitive forms of punishment:  
 
Human beings are a punitive species. Perhaps because we are social animals, and require 
the cooperation of others to achieve our goals, we are strongly disposed to punish those 
who take advantage of us. Those who ‘free-ride’, taking benefits to which they are not 
entitled, are subject to exclusion, the imposition of fines or harsher penalties. 
Wrongdoing arouses strong emotions in us, whether it is done to us, or to others. Our 
indignation and resentment have fuelled a dizzying variety of punitive practices – 
ostracism, branding, beheading, quartering, fining, and very many more. The details vary 
from place to place and time to culture but punishment has been a human universal, 
because it has been in our evolutionary interests. However, those evolutionary impulses 
are crude guides to how we should deal with offenders in contemporary society. (2016) 
 
Crude indeed! As Waller notes: “Looking carefully at the strike-back emotion we share with rats 
and chimps prompts doubts of its legitimacy as a foundation for our moral thoughts” (2015: 43). 
When we do look carefully, what we find is that the powerful strike-back emotion overwhelms 
careful reflection—the kind of careful reflection that is required if we wish to adopt more 
effective and humane policies regarding punishment.  
 
This is not to say, of course, that our moral emotions are always bad or that we should wish to 
eliminate them completely. Waller correctly points out that in certain circumstances anger 
provides an important ethical need (2015: 45-51)—e.g., exhibiting the right emotion when 
someone I love is seriously wronged. In fact, there are many emotions we do not wish to 
eliminate, but that we do not always regard as reliable guides to behavior. These considerations 
lead Waller to conclude: 
 
Thus as a moral responsibility abolitionist I feel anger at cruel acts, and do not think it 
desirable to eliminate such emotions (to put it badly, I am glad I feel such angry 
emotions); but that is consistent with believing that it would be wrong to use those 
emotions as guides to behavior or as justification for the system of moral responsibility. 
(2015: 49) 
 
On these points, I agree. But I would like to recommend two helpful supplements to Waller’s 
account.  
 
First, like Waller, I acknowledge that the emotional reactions associated with the desire to strike 
back are natural, but at the same time challenge the claim that they are justified. Consider, once 
again, the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, blame, and moral anger. Since these 
reactive attitudes can cause harm, they would be appropriate only if it is fair that the agent be 
subject to them in the sense that she deserves them. We can say, then, that an agent is 
accountable for her action when she deserves, in the basic desert sense, to be praised or blamed 
for what she did—i.e., she deserves certain kinds of desert-based judgments, attitudes, or 
treatments in response to decisions or actions she performed or failed to perform, and these 
judgments, attitudes, or treatments are justified on purely backward-looking grounds and do not 
appeal to consequentialist or forward-looking considerations, such as future protection, future 
reconciliation, or future moral formation. 
 
The version of free will skepticism I defend, which includes a skepticism about moral 
responsibility (more on this in a moment), maintains that agents are never morally responsible in 
the basic desert sense, and hence expression of resentment, indignation, and moral anger 
involves doxastic irrationality (at least to the extent it is accompanied by the belief that its target 
deserves to be its recipient). Of course one could ask, as surely a Strawsonian would, “But can 
we ever really relinquish these reactive attitudes? And would it be desirable if we could?” In 
response, I would first say that the moral anger associated with the reactive attitudes of 
resentment and indignation is often corrosive to our interpersonal relationships and to our social 
policies (see Caruso 2016a, 2016b). Like Pereboom (2001, 2014), I contend that the expression 
of these reactive attitudes are often suboptimal as modes of communication in relationships 
relative to alternative attitudes available to us—e.g., feeling hurt, or shocked, or disappointed.  
 
On the question of whether it is possible to relinquish these reactive attitudes, my answer begins 
by first distinguishing between what Shaun Nichols calls narrow-profile emotional responses 
and wide-profile responses (Nichols 2007; see also Pereboom 2014). It is this distinction that I 
offer up as a supplement to Waller’s account. Narrow-profile emotional responses are local or 
immediate emotional reactions to a situation. Wide-profile responses are not immediate and can 
involve rational reflection. I believe it is perfectly consistent for a free will skeptic to maintain 
that expressions of resentment and indignation are irrational and still acknowledge that there may 
be certain types and degrees of resentment and indignation that are beyond our power to affect. 
If, for example, some serious moral wrong were done to my wife and daughter, I doubt I would 
be able to keep myself from some degree of narrow-profile, immediate resentment (nor, as 
Waller points out, would I be judged kindly if I did). Nevertheless, in wide-profile cases, we do 
have the ability to diminish or even eliminate resentment and indignation, or at least disavow it 
in the sense of rejecting any force it might be thought to have in justifying harmful reactions and 
policies (see Pereboom 2014). And since the wide-profile emotional reactions are most important 
when it comes to public policy—waging war, criminal sentencing, justifying punishment, etc.—I 
do believe philosophical arguments against moral responsibility can change our practices and 
reactions.     
 
My second supplement to Waller’s account draws on recent empirical work in social psychology, 
which indicates that how we assign responsibility is correlated with prior judgments of what 
counts as being morally bad, which are in turn dependent upon other, larger, social and cultural 
factors (see Hardcastle, forthcoming). Take, for example, Mark Alicke’s culpable control model 
of blame. It proposes that our desire to blame someone intrudes on our assessments of that 
person’s ability to control his or her thoughts or behavior (Alicke 2000, 2008, Alicke et al. 
2008a, 2008b). As Valerie Hardcastle describes:  
 
Deciding that someone is responsible for an act, which is taken to be the conclusion of a 
judgment, is actually part of our psychological process of assessing blame. If we start 
with a spontaneous negative reaction, then that can lead to our hypothesizing that the 
source of the action is blameworthy as well as to an active desire to blame that source. 
This desire, in turn, skews our interpretations of the available evidence such that it 
supports our blame hypothesis. We highlight evidence that indicates negligence, 
recklessness, impure motives, or a faulty character, and we ignore evidence that suggests 
otherwise. In other words, instead of dispassionately judging whether someone is 
responsible, we validate our spontaneous reaction of blameworthiness. (forthcoming)  
 
In fact, as Hardcastle cites, data suggests that we often exaggerate a person’s actual or potential 
control over an event to justify our blame judgment and we will even change the threshold of 
how much control is required for a blame judgment (Alicke et al. 2008; see also Alicke 1994; 
Clark et al. 2014; Everett et al., forthcoming; Berg and Vidmar 1975; Eften 1974; Lagnado and 
Channon 2008; Lerner and Miller 1978; Lerner et al. 1976; Neimeth and Sosis 1973; Schlenker 
1980; Snyder et al. 1983; Sosis 1974).  
 
A recent set of studies by Cory Clark and his colleagues (2014), for example, found that a key 
factor promoting belief in free will is a fundamental desire to blame and hold others morally 
responsible for their wrongful behaviors. Across five studies they found evidence that greater 
belief in free will is due to heightened punitive motivations. In one study, for instance, an 
ostensibly real classroom cheating incident led to increased free will beliefs, presumably due to 
heightened punitive motivations. In a second study, they found that the prevalence of immoral 
behavior, as measured by crime and homicide rates, predicted free will belief on a country level. 
These findings suggest that our desire to blame and hold others morally responsible comes first 
and drives our belief in free will, rather than the other way around.  
 
Other researchers have found that our judgment on whether an action was done on purpose or not 
is influenced by our moral evaluation of the outcome of certain actions—i.e., whether we 
morally like or dislike it (Nadelhoffer 2006). Additional findings have found an asymmetric 
understanding of the moral nature of our own actions and those of others, such that we judge our 
own actions and motivations as more moral than those of the average person (Epley 2000). As 
Maureen Sie describes: 
 
In cases of other people acting in morally wrong ways we tend to explain those 
wrongdoings in terms of the agent’s lack of virtue or morally bad character traits. We 
focus on those elements that allow us to blame agents for their moral wrongdoings. On 
the other hand, in cases where we ourselves act in morally reprehensible ways we tend to 
focus on exceptional elements of our situation, emphasizing the lack of room to do 
otherwise. (2013: 283) 
 
These empirical findings help support Waller’s argument concerning the role the strike back 
emotion plays in our moral responsibility beliefs and practices. It appears that our moral 
responsibility practices are often driven, possibly primarily driven, by our desire to blame, 
punish, and strike back at moral transgressors, rather than, and often in lieu of, our more rational 
and objective judgments about free will, control, and moral responsibility.   
 
Keeping in mind, then, that I share with Waller both his long-standing skepticism about moral 
responsibility and his analysis of why the belief in moral responsibility is so stubborn, I will now 
turn to our one point of substantive disagreement: whether or not the concept of free will should 
be preserved. While I completely agree with Waller that backward-looking moral responsibility, 
praise and blame, and the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, guilt, and righteous anger 
cannot be justified in a naturalist world devoid of miracles, I see no justification for, or benefit 
in, preserving his restorative notion of free will. In both The Stubborn System of Moral 
Responsibility (Ch.6) and in his new book Restorative Free Will (2016), Waller argues that free 
will can flourish in the absence of moral responsibility. Since I have recently criticized this 
aspect of Waller’s account elsewhere (Caruso 2016c), I will keep my comments here brief. 
 
On Waller’s account, free will amounts to the ability to discriminate among and evaluate 
alternatives and the ability to adjust the level of behavioral variability to environmental 
conditions. I contend that this conception of free will makes the dispute between compatibilists 
and incompatibilists a moot point since no one in the debate denies that we have the kinds of 
abilities discussed by Waller. The question most philosophers are interested in—the question that 
is of central philosophical and practical importance in the free will debate—is whether these 
abilities are enough to justify certain kinds of desert-based judgments, attitudes, or treatments in 
response to decisions or actions that an agent performed or failed to perform. On this point, 
Waller and I both agree that the answer is no. It’s hard to see how Waller’s conception of 
restorative free will—divorced as it is from moral responsibility—helps resolve that debate, or 
frankly any other significant debate related to the historical problem of free will. Even if we 
grant Waller his restorative free will, it is difficult to think of anything of importance that follows 
from it regarding our everyday practices, judgments, and attitudes. By liberating free will from 
moral responsibility, Waller has seemingly liberated it from all of its philosophical and practical 
importance. 
 
I have elsewhere argued that there are several distinct advantages to defining free will in terms of 
the control in action required for basic desert moral responsibility (see Caruso and Morris, 
forthcoming): (a) it provides a neutral definition that virtually all parties can agree to—i.e., it 
doesn’t exclude from the outset various conceptions of free will that are available for 
compatibilists, libertarians, and free will skeptics to adopt; (b) it captures the practical 
importance of the debate; (c) it fits with the commonsense (i.e., folk) understanding of these 
concepts; and, perhaps most importantly, (d) rejecting this understanding of free will makes it 
difficult to understand the nature of the substantive disputes that are driving the free will debate. 
Waller’s conception of free will, it seems to me, fails to have any of these virtues (see Caruso 
2016c). I therefore encourage my good friend to follow me down the “sinful path of free will 
eliminativism” (Waller 216: x).    
 
Let me end with some final thoughts. No one has influenced my thinking on moral responsibility 
more than Bruce Waller. For that I owe him a great debt. Like Waller, I believe we should 
“destroy moral responsibility, drive a stake in its heart, and bury it at the crossroads” (2016: viii). 
But given how strong and stubborn the belief in moral responsibility is, this will not be easy. 
Furthermore, Waller’s desire to preserve free will, contrary to his good intentions, may actually 
be standing in the way of achieving that end. Jasmine Carey and Delroy Paulhus (2013) have 
recently found that where belief in free will is strongest we tend to find increased retributive 
moral judgments. More specifically, they found that free will believers were more likely to call 
for harsher criminal punishment in a number of hypothetical scenarios. Shariff et al. (2014) have 
reported similar findings. In one study Shariff and his colleagues found that people with weaker 
free will beliefs endorsed less retributive attitudes regarding punishment of criminals, yet their 
consequentialist attitudes were unaffected. In a different study they found that experimentally 
diminishing free will belief through anti-free-will arguments diminished retributive punishment, 
suggesting a causal relationship. This research provides prima facie support for thinking that the 
folk conceive of free will as linked with moral responsibility and, more specifically, retributivist 
judgments. If Waller wants to reduce the latter, as I know he does, his free will preservationism 
may be counterproductive.  
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